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RECENT CASES
Bankruptcy -Frazier-Lemke Act-Requirement of Good Faith
for Proceeding Thereunder-Farmer instituted proceedings under
Section 75 subsection (s) of Bankruptcy Act (Frazier-Lemke Act) I
although there was no substantial equity, actual or potential, above the
mortgage debt, and hence no reasonable probability of his financial rehabilitation. Held (one judge dissenting), that the court erred in dismissing
petition on ground of lack of good faith in filing petition, for subsection (s)
does not make good faith a condition precedent to a proceeding thereunder.

Bartels v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 6 U. S. L.
637 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938).

WEEK

Similar proceedings instituted by farmer upon failure to obtain creditors' acceptances to plan of composition and extension proposed under
subsections (a) to (r) of Section 75. Plan provided for three-year moratorium of farmer's debts, payment of only 5 per cent. interest, but no rent
during period of extension. After first meeting of creditors he took no
steps to procure acceptances beyond communicating with one of twenty
creditors affected. Held (one judge dissenting), proceedings properly
dismissed for lack of good faith in filing petition. In re Henderson, 6 U. S.
L. WEExK 637 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938).
Justifiable anxiety over the plight of farmer-debtors induced passage
of the Frazier-Lemke Act to open another avenue of possible rehabilitation where creditors, by refusing to accept a debtor's plan of composition
2
or extension, have cut off the only means of relief hitherto available. It
is certainly preferable that solution of the debtor's difficulties issue from
voluntary agreement with his creditors rather than from proceedings
against their wishes. Hence it is only upon refusal of creditors to accept
a proposal of composition or extension that the farmer may amend his
petition and seek adjudication in bankruptcy under subsection (s). No
express provision is to be found in this subsection that the initial proposal
x. 49 STAT. 943 (1935), 11 U. S. C. A. § 2o3 (s) (937), held constitutional by the
Supreme Court in Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank of Roanoke,
300 U. S. 440 (937).
Intended originally as a temporary measure to expire in 1938,
the Act has now been extended until March, 1940. 52 STAT. 84 (1938), 1I U. S. C. A.
§ 203 (c) (Supp. 1938). The original Frazier-Lemke Act adding subsection (s) to
Section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act, 48 STAT. 1289 (934), had been declared unconstitutional in Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555 (935), and it

was to meet the constitutional objections to this Act that the later one was passed. See
Diamond and Letzler, The New Frazier-Lemke Act: A Study (937) 37 CoL. L. REV.
1092; Roberts, The New Frazier-Levike Act-Its Provisions, Its Constitutionality
(1936) 22 A. B. A. J. 15.
2. See In re Borgelt, io F. Supp. 113, i15 (S. D. Ill. i935), aft'd, 79 F. (2d) 929
(C. C. A. 7th, 1935) ; Baxter v. Savings Bank of Utica, 92 F. (2d) 404, 406 (C. C. A.
5th, 1937). See also 78 CONG. REc. 12135 (1934) ; Diamond and Letzler, supra note I,
at 11o4; Note (1935) 44 YArm L. J. 651-653.

3. The advantage of such an agreement lies in the preservation of "mutual confidence and good will between debtor and creditors so that by sympathetic co-operation
the success of the plan for the rehabilitation of the debtor may be assured". In re
Mussellman, 25 F. Supp. 249, 250 (E. D. Ky. x936). It is often declared, therefore,
that the gist of § 75 is voluntary compromise, ibid.; and that the efficacy of subsection (s) lies in its inducement to serious consideration by the creditor of such a
voluntary arrangement, see Baxter v. Savings Bank of Utica, 92 F. (2d) 404, 406 (C.
C. A. 5th, 1937) ; besides affording the creditor the opportunity of weighing the relative
advantages to be gained under subsections (a) to (r) or subsection (s), see In re Vater,
14 F. Supp. 631, 633 (E. D. Ky. 1936).
(739)
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must be in "good faith", and by giving controlling effect to this omission
the Bartels case 4 reached a conclusion which overlooks the real objectives
of the Act. That case failed where the Henderson case - succeeded in recognizing the implicit necessity of "good faith", for the reasoning of the
Bartels case, if carried to its logical conclusion, would render the requirement of a prior proposal of composition or extension meaningless. It
could be met by any plan so ridiculous in its terms that the creditor would
be effectually deprived of any opportunity for amicable compromise which
might prove more advantageous to him than bankruptcy. To obviate such
an unreasonable interpretation of this provision, the overwhelming majority
of cases which have considered the question have held that subsection (s)
contemplates the prior unsuccessful submission of a proposal in accordance with subsections (a) to (r) ; 1 subsection (i) 7 provides for "good
faith"; and this, therefore, indirectly becomes an essential element in the
institution of proceedings under subsection (s).11 By "good faith" is meant
more than mere honesty or freedom from actual fraud., It connotes the
submission of a feasible plan of settlement under circumstances where there
is still a reasonable chance of financial rehabilitation."0 Mere perfunctory
submission of a proposal for composition without sincere efforts to achieve
its acceptance," or the submission of a proposal the terms of which are
such that no creditor could reasonably be expected to consider them seriously1 2 are dearly indicative of lack of good faith. Furthermore, since
the purpose of this subsection was to provide a respite for the distressed
farmer, and afford him an opportunity to save his property from foreclosure, it is not unreasonable to deny its availability to those whose finan4. The first of the instant cases, 6 U. S. L. W=Ei 637 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938).
5. The second of the instant cases, ibid.
6. 47 STAT. 1470 (1934), 1iU. S. C. A. § 203 (a)-(r) (1937).
7. 47 STAT. 1472 (1934), 1i U. S. C. A. §2o3 (i)

(1937).

8. In re Samuelson, 8 F. Supp. 473 (S. D. Iowa, 1934) ; it re Schaeffer, 14 F.
Supp. 807 (D. Md. 1936); In re Dionne, 21 F. Supp. 311 (D. Me. 1937); In re Dandy,
23 F. Supp. 361 (W. D. S. C. 1938); see Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain
Trust Bank of Roanoke, 300 U. S. 440, 462, n. 6 (1937). See also Diamond and Letzler, supra note i, at io5; Hanna, Agriculture and the Bankruptcy Act (1934) 19
MiNN. L. REv. 1, 15.

Closely analogous to the requirement of good faith in the proposal of a plan of
composition for the relief of farmers is that required for reorganization under § 77B,
48 STAT. 912 (1934), II U. S. C. A. § 207 (1937). Manati Sugar Co. v. Mock, 75 F.
(2d) 284 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935) ; In re Grigsby-Grunow Co., 77 F. (2d) 200 (C. C. A.
7th, 1935) ; In re Tennessee Pub. Co., 81 F. (2d) 463 (C. C. A. 6th, 1936).
Dismissal of petition without notice to debtor and opportunity to be heard on issue
of good faith is denial of due process. Compare Sheets v. Livy, 97 F. (2d) 674 (C. C.
A. 4th, 1938) with Massey v. Farmers' and Merchants' Nat. Bank, 94 F. (2d) 526
(C. C. A. 4th, 1938), cert. denied, 303 U. S. 665 (1938). And although the farmer may
not be entitled to adjudication under subsection (s) because of the lack of good faith, it
has been held error to dismiss his petition entirely when it is couched in such terms as
to indicate his desire for adjudication as an ordinary bankrupt, for the court should
proceed to so adjudicate him under § 22, 52 STAT. 854, 11 U. S. C. A. § 45 (Supp. 1938).
Baxter v. Savings Bank of Utica, 92 F. (2d) 404 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937) ; Sheets v. Livy,
97 F. (2d) 674 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1938).
9. In re Schaeffer, 14 F. Supp. 807 (D. Md. 1936) ; In re Vater, 14 F. Supp. 631
(E. D. Ky. 1936); In re Dionne, 21 F. Supp. 311 (D. Me. 1937); Baxter v. Savings
Bank of Utica, 92 F. (2d) 4o4 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937).
io. In re Byrd, 15 F. Supp. 453 (D. Md. 1936); Lemm v. Northern California
Nat. Bank, 93 F. (2d) 7o9 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938) ; Doak v. Federal Land Bank of Baltimore, 99 F. (2d) 145 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938).
II. Massey v. Farmers' and Merchants' Nat. Bank, 94 F. (2d) 526 (C. C. A. 4 th,
1938), cert. denied, 303 U. S. 665 (1938).
12. Compare In re Mussellman, 25 F. Supp. 249 (E. D. Ky. 1936) with In re
Reaney, 25 F. Supp. 71 (W. D. Pa. 1938).
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cial situation is such that eventual rehabilitation is not foreseeable. To
allow a petition under such circumstances would amount to "postponing
inevitable liquidation" 13-- a result which is patently unjust to the creditors, and which was certainly not within the contemplation of Congress.1 4
So well established is this interpretation of the Frazier-Lemke Act that
the Bartels case is unique in its holding to the contrary.1 5
Mortgages-Deficiency Judgment Allowed after Note Barred by
Statute of Limitations where Mortgage Contains Covenant to PayA mortgage, executed to secure a note, contained a covenant in which the
debtor agreed to pay the principal sum of the loan. After the statute of
limitations had run on the note, the mortgagee sought to foreclose the
mortgage and secure a deficiency judgment. Held (three judges dissenting), that this could be done because the covenant was not barred by the
running of the statute on the note. GuardianDepositors Corp. of Detroit
v. Savage, 283 N. W. 26 (Mich. 1938).
Ordinarily, a mortgage transaction involves two instruments: a negotiable note and the formal mortgage which is the security for the note.
Since the statutes of limitations applicable to unsealed instruments generally provide for a shorter period within which an action can be brought
than those limiting suits on formal instruments, the problem arises whether
any action can be maintained on the mortgage after a judgment can no
longer be rendered on the note.1 Most states permit the mortgage to be
foreclosed in this situation although no deficiency judgment will be rendered 2 but among those which subscribe to the "lien" theory of the mortgage transaction, some permit no action on the mortgage on the ground
that the limitation on the note leaves nothing for which the creditor needs
security.8 Such a conflict of result cannot be reconciled by reliance on
13. Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank of Roanoke, 3oo U. S.
440, 462, n. 6 (937).

14. See In re Paul, 13 F. Supp. 645, 647 (S. D. Iowa, 1936) ; In re Anderson, 22
F. Supp. 928, 932 (D. N. C. 1938); Cowherd v. Phoenix Joint Stock Land Bank of
Kansas City, 99 F. (2d) 225, 227 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938).
15. It is interesting to note that Sibley, J., who wrote the majority opinion in the
Bartels case (the first of the instant cases), and Holmes, J., who dissented in the Bartels
case and wrote the majority opinion in the Henderson case (the second of the instant
cases) had previously concurred in Baxter v. Savings Bank of Utica, 92 F. (2d) 4o4
(C. C. A. 5th, 1937) declaring a proposal of composition in good faith to be a condition precedent to proceeding under subsection (s) ; but in the Bartels case Sibley, J.,
recants and calls that holding "inaccurate".
I. 2 JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928)
2. Title states: Harris v. Mosley, 195

§ 1542.
Ark. 62, Ti S. W. (2d) 563 (1938) ; Markham v. Smith, iig Conn. 355, 176 At. 88o (1935) ; Miller v. Horowitz, 172 Md. 419,
191 Atl. 9o6 (1937) ; Pearson v. Mulloney, 289 Mass. 5o8, 194 N. E. 458 (1935) ; Charlotte Nat'l Bank v. Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co., 21o N. C. 140, 185 S. E. 648 (1936);
Hartranft's Estate, 153 Pa. 530, 26 Atl. IO4 (1893) ; Kulp v. Brant, 162 Pa. 222, 29 Atl.
729 (1894); Williamson Bros. v. Daniel, 21 Tenn. App. 346, 1io S. W. (2d) 1O28
(1937); Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 157 Va. 454, 161 S. E. 237 (931).
Contra: Hodges v. Taft, 194 Ark. 259, io6 S. W. (2d) 6o5 (1937).
Lien states: Kirkpatrick v. Few, 182 Ga. 25, 184 S. E. 855 (1936) ; Wisdon v.
Smith, 124 Fla. 371, 168 So. 814 (1936) ; Burrer v. Burrer, 65 S. Dak. 520, 275 N. W.
344 (1937) ; Hare v. Reddy, 222 Wis. 508, 269 N. W. 294 (1936).
3. Flack v. Boland, 77 P. (2d) iogo (Calif. 1938) ; Troxell v. Cleveland Oil Co.,
145 Kan. 658, 66 P. (2d) 545 (1937) ; Zimmer v. Charbonnet, I85 La. 148, 168 So. 757
(1936) ; Gates v. Chandler, 174 Miss. 815, 165 So. 442 (1936) ; Reickhoff v. Woodhall,
75 P. (2d) 56 (Mont. 1938) ; Pratt v. Pratt, 121 Wash. 298, 209 Pac. 535 (1922), 71
U. OF PA. L. REV. 284 (1923) ; Fleishbein v. Thorne, 193 Wash. 65, 74 P. (2d) 880
(1937) ; Graham v. Letot, 1O3 S. W. (2d) lO3i (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
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the distinction between the "lien" and "title" theories 4 since both cases
involve a security transaction and regardless of whether the mortgagee
is said to get title or a lien, he has a legal interest in the mortgagor's property which, being evidenced by a formal document, should survive the bar
on the debt. That something remains after the limitation has operated
on the note is most clearly illustrated by the refusal in the "lien" jurisdictions to remove the cloud cast on the property by the recorded mortgage until the mortgagor pays the debt 1. By placing the mortgagor's
covenant to pay in the mortgage deed, as in the instant case, one further
remedy is made available to the mortgagee because he now has the promise
of the mortgagor as formally evidenced as is the deed itself and there is no
danger that the debt will be barred by a shorter statute of limitations. In
allowing a judgment on this covenant, the court appears to be acting correctly because it gives effect to the intention of the parties; it has the undivided support of former cases ' and is closely analogous to the practice
commonly used in Pennsylvania 7 of requiring the mortgagor to execute
a sealed note or bond with the mortgage. By adopting this procedure,
the mortgagee avoids the difficulties encountered in attempting to enforce
the mortgage after the debt has been barred since he is assured of a remedy
on the debt as long as one exists on the mortgage.8

Sales-Trust Receipts-Validity of Unrecorded Trust Receipts as
against Third Parties-A manufacturer shipped electric refrigators to
a dealer, shipper's order, bill of lading attached. The dealer paid io per
cent. of the factory invoice price to petitioner which paid entire amount of
draft and took the bill of lading and a bill of sale. At the same time the
dealer, without recording, executed to the petitioner trust receipts for the
refrigerators. Subsequently, the dealer made an assignment for the benefit
of creditors, and upon the assignee's taking possession of the goods, petitioner instituted a reclamation proceeding. Held, that the trust receipts
constituted a lien void against general creditors because not recorded, and
therefore the assignee prevailed.' C. I. T. Corp. v. Seaney, 85 P. (2d) 713
(Ariz. 1938).
4. I JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. x928) § 16.
5. Provident Mutual Building-Loan Ass'n v. Schwertner, I5 Ariz. 517, 140 Pac.
495 (1914); Raggio v. Palmtag, i55 Calif. 797, io3 Pac. 312 (19o9) ; Berkley v. Idol,
gi Kan. i6, 136 Pac. 923 (1913).

6. New England Mortgage Co. v. Reding, 65 Ark. 489, 47 S. W.

beck & Betx Eagle Brewing Co. v. Krause, 94 N. J. Law

219, io9

132

(i898) ; Lem-

Atl.

293

(i92o) ;

Krueger Brewing Co. v. Remek, Iio N. J. Law 489, 166 Atl. i69 (1933) ; Schwary v.
Schwary, 138 Ore. 690, 7 P. (2d) 986 (1932) ; Dinniny v. Gavin, 4 App. Div. 298, 39
N. Y. Supp. 485 (1896) ; Brackenridge v. Cummins, i8 Pa. Super. 64 (r9oi) ; Ogden
v. Bradshaw, i6I Wis. 49, i5O N. W. 399 (1915); see Batten v. Jurist, 3o6 Pa. 64, 6,
i58 Atl. 557, 559 (1932).
7. See (1923) 71 U. OF PA. L. REV. 284, 285.
8. New England Mortgage Co. v. Reding, 65 Ark. 489, 47 S. W. 132 (i898). But
compare Hodges v. Taft, 194 Ark. 259, io6 S. W. (2d) 6o5 (i937) with Harris v.
Mosley, 195 Ark. 62, I1 S. W. (2d) 563 (1938).
i. Having decided that the interest of the petitioner was simply that of a lienholder, and no more, the court did not attempt to classify the transaction as a conditional sale or chattel mortgage, but ruled that the trust receipt should have been filed
under the recording acts for those security devices. ARIz. REv. CODE (Struckmeyer,
1928) §§ 2330, 2890, 2891.
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Originally an instrument used exclusively by importers, 2 the trust
receipt has recently been adopted on a wide scale by dealers in automobiles and electrical appliances.3 Because it bears sufficient resemblance to
other security devices, it has been set off into a number of categories by
the courts, and variously labeled a bailment, 4 conditional sale, 5 chattel mortgage,8 or simply termed a "special form of security title and no more".7
Impelled by a desire to protect the rights of third parties, the state courts
have most frequently denominated it as either a conditional sale or chattel
mortgage, and thereby thrown the protecting cloak of the recording acts
over innocent third parties. While ignoring the equities of the third party,
the federal courts have taken a more logical stand by refusing to regard
the transaction as falling within these concepts.8 Refusing to draw parallels based on substantive similarities,9 these courts have stressed the distinguishing features which mark the trust receipt off from other credit devices. Thus, it fails of being a conditional sale because the lender may
retake at any time, while the conditional vendor may only repossess on
default; moreover, the lender may both resell and sue for any deficiency,
whereas, absent a statute, 10 the conditional vendor is allowed the alternatives of retaking or suing for the balance due. And while the drift is
toward construing the trust receipt as a chattel mortgage, it should be
pointed out that, unlike the true mortgage which is a bipartite affair, title
is never in the borrower during the life of the credit extension. Like the
federal courts, the instant tribunal refrained from classifying the trust receipt, but, to safeguard third persons, did call for recording. Since in
the usual case the borrower is a dealer, creditors are not likely to extend
credit merely in reliance on his possession of the goods. On the other
hand, the inconvenience to the business world of recording these short time
dealings under ordinary statutes may well outweigh the benefits to be
derived.:1 It would seem, therefore, that, in the absence of legislation,
it is both economically desirable and logical to allow the transaction to go
unrecorded. But, to bridge the gap between the two approaches, the Uni2. For a detailed account of such a transaction and on the subject of trust receipts
generally see Frederick, The Trust Receipt as Security (1922) 22 COL L. Rnv. 395.
3. Note (933) 31 Mica. L. REv. 558, 559.
4. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Hupfer, 113 Neb. 228, 2o2 N. W. 627
(1925) ; Hamilton v. Billington, 163 Pa. 76, 29 Aft. 904 (1894).

5. Commercial Acceptance Trust v. Bailey, 87 Cal. App. 117, 261 Pac. 743

(1927);

New Haven Wire Cases, 57 Conn. 352, 18 Atl. 266 (1889); Ohio Savings Bank &

Trust Co. v. Schneider, 202 Iowa 938, 211 N. W. 248 (1926) ; General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Whitely, 217 Iowa 998, 252 N. W. 779 (934).

6. Auburn Auto Co. v. Namor Corp., 112 Fla. 7, 149 So. 8o (933); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Sharp Motor Sales Co., 233 Ky. 290, 25 S. W. (2d) 405
(1930) ; Smith v. Commercial Credit Corp., 113 N. J. Eq. 12, I65 AUt. 637 (933);
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Boddeker, 274 S. W. ioi6 (TeM. Civ. App. 1925).
7. See In re Bettman-Johnson Co., 250 Fed. 657, 663 (C. C. A. 6th, igi8). See
also Charavay & Bodvin v. York Silk Mfg. Co., i7O Fed. 81g (S. D. N. Y. 19o9); In
re James, Inc., 30 F. (2d) 555 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929) ; General Motors Acceptance Corp.
v. Kline, 78 F. (2d) 618 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935).
8. See cases cited supra note 7. It should be noted that in the light of Erie R. I.

v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938) the federal decisions are now probably little more
than persuasive authority.
9. See Frederick, The Trust Receipt as Security (1922) 22 COL. L. REv. 395, 399;
Vold, Trust Receipt Security it Financing of Sales (193o) 15 CORN. L. Q. 543, 557.
io. The provisions of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act §§ 16-22 vary the procedure and afford the buyer and seller remedies not enjoyed at common law.
'
ii. See Hanna, Trust Receipts (931) ig CALi. L. REV. 257, 273.
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form Trust Receipts Act 12 has been formulated, recognizing the trust
receipt as an independent type of security measure attempting not only to
protect third parties, but also save the business man some of the burden
and expense of the usual recording acts.' 3 The act is finding favor, 14 and
properly so, for not only will it help resolve the legal confusion occasioned
by the growing use of the trust receipt and so spare the courts the tortuous
problem faced in the instant case, but will also give greater security to the
parties involved.

Securities-Protection for Preferred Shareholders Under the Pub-

lic Utility Holding Company Act-As part of a simplification plan
whereby one subsidiary is to be eliminated from its holding-company system, the North American Company filed declarations pursuant to § 7 of the
Public Utility Holding Company Act' under which the declarant proposed to amend its certificate of incorporation so as inter alia to issue
$34,879,ooo worth of new 54 per cent. cumulative preferred stock in addition to its already outstanding 6 per cent. cumulative preferred stock. 2
Under the amendment the preferred shareholders, voting separately as a
class, will be entitled to elect one-fourth of the board of directors. If
dividends are in default on the preferred stock for three years, however,
the preferred shareholders will be entitled to elect a bare majority of the
board until the default is remedied. It is provided further that no dividends shall be paid on the common stock unless after such payment "there
shall remain a balance of earned surplus, net profits, and reserves created
12. For a summary of the provisions of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act see
Bogert, The Effect of the Trust Receipts Act (i935) 3 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 26; Legis.

(1934) 82 U. oF PA. L. REv. 270.
13. Uniform Trust Receipts Act § 13 makes filing of the transaction optional, and

all that is required is a statement by lender and borrower of their intention to use the
trust receipt with respect to certain goods. Such notice is effective for one year, and
renewable after the execution of the trust receipt without recording. UNIFORm TRUST
REcEmIs Acr § 8 (i).
14. The Uniform Trust Receipts Act has been adopted in commercially influential
jurisdictions: ILL. REv. STAT. (Cahill & Moore, 1935) c. 14oa, §§ 13-34; Ind. Laws
1935, c. 2o6; Ore. Laws 1935, c. 224; N. Y. PERs. PRoP. LAW § 5o-58L.
1. 49 STAT. 815, I5U. S. C. A. § 79 (g) (c) (1935). "Section 7 (c) (I)provides
that the Commission shall not permit a declaration regarding the issue and sale of a
security to become effective unless it finds such security is, generally speaking (a) a
common stock having a par value; (b) an appropriately secured bond; (c) an assumption of liability on the security of another company; or (d) a receiver's or trustee's
certificate. These restrictions apply unless a security falls within one of the categories
specified in Section 7 (c) (2) or Section 7 (c) (3). One of those categories includes
securities issued or sold solely for the purpose of refunding, extending, exchanging, or
discharging an outstanding security of the declarant and/or a predecessor company
thereof or for the purpose of effecting a merger, consolidation, or other reorganization."
Instant case at

23.

Thus § 7 (c) (i)prohibits the issuance of preferred stock by a public utility holding company unless the purpose comes within the exceptions of § 7 (c)(2). The stock
in the instant case comes within one of those exceptions but by analogy to In the Matter
of National Gas and Electric Corporation, Holding Company Act Release No. 768,
Aug. 4, 1937, there would seem to be a "heavy presumption" against the issuance of
such stock and "the burden of establishing the unusual and exceptional circumstances
which permit it, is on a declarant."
2. The company also had outstanding no par common stock, each share having a
stated value of $io. Under the amendment this stock would be changed to have a par
value of $Ioper share. In addition to the preferred stock which was to be issued, the
company also intended to issue $7o,ooo,ooo worth of debentures.
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for loss resulting from the revaluation, sale or other disposition of any of the
assets of the company, which shall in the aggregate be at least equal to i S
per cent. of the aggregate par value of all preferred stock then outstanding."1 Held (Commissioner Frank dissenting), the declaration may
become effective. In the Matter of North American Company, Holding
Company Act Release No. 1427, January 30, 1939.
This was the first large new issue of preferred stock by a public utility
holding company to come before the Securities and Exchange Commission.4 Although the majority opinion warns that no generalization can
be made from this case as respects standards for preferred stock,5 the decision itself fails to put into practice much that the Commission has preached
in the past.6 As forcefully pointed out by Commissioner Frank, some
provisions should have been included in the certificate of organization 7 to
protect the holders of the new preferred stock against three major evils.
The first danger arises from the fact that under the corporation law of
New Jersey s pursuant to which the North American Company is incorporated, current dividends cannot be paid out of current earnings when
there is a capital impairment. Since the consent of the common shareholders is necessary to reduce the capital so as to eliminate the impairment,
the common shareholders are in a position to coerce the preferred into
yielding their rights to receive unpaid accumulated dividends in return for
the consent of the common shareholders to the reduction plan.9 The second evil is an outgrowth of the first. When there has been such a reduction in the capital and thereafter dividends on the common stock are paid
out of current earnings, such dividends "are in fact, although not in form,
being paid out of capital"' 0 with a consequent impairment of the capital
3. Instant case at 8. "This provision purports to create a protective cushion for
the preferred shareholders. . . . as of June 3o, 1938, North American had an earned
surplus of $4o,082,25o and a reserve for contingencies of $32,8Oi,97o. In addition the
common stock account is in the amount of $85,744,29o. This reserve for contingencies
was created out of capital surplus. Representatives of the management testified that
there are no recognized present losses which are chargeable against this reserve." Id.
at 2o. The majority of the Commission felt that these figures indicate "the present
existence" of a capital cushion, but Commissioner Frank contended that the present
prosperity of the company is no guarantee against possible future severe losses, in which
event the preferred shareholders would be unprotected.
Commissioner Frank also attacked the restrictive provision itself as being inadequate. "That (the provision) means that the company can pay out common dividends,
even if, after paying the same, it has no earned surplus and no net profits. All that will
be necessary, so far as this clause is concerned, is that the company have a particular
kind of reserve of approximately $9.8 millions. That reserve need not be provided
out of earned surplus or earnings. It need not be a reserve to meet future operating
losses, but solely a reserve (which can be created out of capital surplus) to meet losses
which might result from the revaluation, sale or other disposition of assets." Instant
case, dissent, at 55.
4. Instant case, dissent, at 26.
5. Instant case at 24.
6. See especially SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE STUDY
AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WoAx, AcrIVTIEs, PERSONNEL AND FUNCrIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMaMITTEES, PART VII, MANAGEMENT PLANS WITHOUT
Am or COMMITTEES (1938).
7. For suggested provisions see instant case, dissent, at 49, 50.
8. 1 N. J. REv. STAT. (937) tit. i4, c. 8, § 19.
9. In the Matter of International Paper and Power Company, Holding Company
Act Release No. 641, May 5, 1937, 18 et seq. See also the discussion of that case in
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, op. ct. supra note 6, at 6o et seq.
It should be noted that the mere shift in control of the board as the result of defaulted dividends will not permit the payment'of dividends so long as a capital deficit
exists and it is in this situation that coercion by the common shareholders is practiced.
1o. Instant case, dissent, at 41.
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cushion of the preferred shareholders.11 If the latter are preferred upon
a total dissolution of the corporation, it would seem that they should similarly be preferred when there is a partial dissolution, e. g., a reduction in
capital. The third principal danger confronting the holders of the new
issue is the possibility of incurring large corporate debts ranking ahead of
12
Furthermore, it
the preferred stock and thereby impairing its priority.
relied upon will be
measures
protective
the
whether
may be questioned
adequate. No procedure is set out whereby the preferred shareholders
may exercise their right to elect a majority of the board of directors in the
event of defaulted dividends. The period of default required seems unnecessarily long, 13 and such provisions have in the past proved of illusory
value.14 The majority of the Commission also considered its future jurisdiction over the declarant an added safeguard for the preferred shareholders, but failure to afford protection at the time of the stock issue has in
15
several cases proved costly when financial difficulties subsequently arose.
Moreover, there is no certainty that future events may not entirely remove
1
the company from the jurisdiction of the Commission. 6 It must be admitted, however, that despite the grounds for criticism, the declaration and
certificate of organization taken as a whole represent a commendable
advance in corporate practice. Motivated by that factorlT and perhaps
18
also by a desire to break the "log jam of capital", the majority of the
Commission evidently treated this as a "necessitous situation" 19 warranting the relaxation of its own strict requirements.

Taxation-Immunity of the Fees of a State Master-in-Chancery

From Federal Income Tax-Respondent was a master-in-chancery of
the Superior Court of Cook County, Illinois. His office was created, and
his duties, all of a judicial nature, were determined by statute; he took
an oath of office; and his fees were allowed by the court against the losing'
parties and paid by them. This compensation was taxed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Held, the tax is invalid because this type of
immunity does not depend on the existence of any substantial burden on the

state since the respondent is engaged in an essential governmental function,
and therefore, the source of his compensation is immaterial. Commissioner
v. Charles C. Stilwell, 4 C. C. H. 1939 Fed. Tax Serv. § 9250 (C. C. A.
7th, 1939).
ii. See a discussion of this point in SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE CoMMISSION, Op.
cit. supra note 6, at 487 et seq.
12. DEWING, CoRPoRATE SEcuRrrIEs (1934) 185-187.
13. Stevens, Voting Rights of Capital Stock and Stockholders (1938) I J. Bus.
311.
14. An example is the case of the management of R. Hoe & Co., Inc.,
which kept
itself in control although the holders of its Class A stock had had for seven years the
right to elect a majority of the members of the board. SEcuRITIEs AND EXCHANGE
COMMIsSION, op. cit. supra note 6, at III, n. 8.
v5. See Commissioner Frank's discussion of the cases of Columbia Gas and Electric Corporationand InternationalPaper and Power Company, instant case, Appendix
II, 63 et seq.
I6. The holding company may by disposing of its utility secu rities take itself without the jurisdiction of the Commission, or pertinent sections of the Act may be repealed
or modified.
17. Instant case at 24.
I8. See N. Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1939, § 3, P. I, col. I.
ig. The expression was used by Chairman (then Commissioner) Douglas in his
concurring opinion In the Matter of International Paper and Power Company, 2 S. E.
C. DECISIONS, Part I, 274, 283.
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The primary concern of McCulloch v. Maryland' and Collector v.
Day 2 establishing, respectively, federal and state immunity from mutual
taxation was to prevent the exercise of governmental functions from being
interfered with by the adverse use by either of its taxing power. The test
as to what interfered early took the form of whether the function taxed
was essentially governmental or merely proprietary, the tax on the latter
being permitted.3 In the income tax field, since Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell,4 a tax on the compensation of individuals, engaged in the performance of essential governmental functions in the capacity of independent
contractors, has been upheld principally on the ground the tax was too remote, speculative, or indirect.5 And this is true though the compensation
was paid from the state treasury. In the light of that consideration, the
Treasury Department assumed 8 that if the indirectness of the burden eventually falling on state funds is sufficient to make the tax valid, then if no
burden falls on the state by reason of the compensation of the officer or
employee being paid out of private funds, the tax is equally valid. Taxes
imposed on that basis on the compensation of state bank liquidators and
lawyers engaged in dissolution proceedings of insolvent insurance companies, the compensation coming out of the assets of the insolvent estates,
were upheld by the United-States Supreme Court in Helvering v. Therrell.7 However, in addition to observing that the compensation did not
come from funds belonging to the state, that opinion considered the function not essentially governmental, and the taxpayer not an officer of the
state. Hence, this may not support the Treasury ruling that the source of
the funds alone is determinative. The present court disregarded the Treasury view entirely 8 on the ground that although Helvering v. Gerhardt9
(holding valid a tax on employees of the New York Port Authority)
1. 4 Wheat. 316 (i8i9).

2. II Wall. 13 (87).
3. See (1938) 7 GEo. WASH. L. RaY. 128, 129.

4. 269 U. S. 514 (1926) : Tax sustained as to consulting engineers employed by
states and municipalities to give advice with respect to water supply and sewage disposal.
5. See Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, ibid. 526, on the authority of which the follow-

ing per curiam opinions were decided: Lucas, Commissioner v. Howard, 280 U. S. 526
(I929), per curiam decision reversing 29 F. (2d) 895 (C. C. A. 5th, 1928): Federal
income tax held valid on compensation paid lawyer for services rendered municipality
in the regulation of public utilities; Lucas, Commissioner v. Reed, 281 U. S. 699 (I93O),
per curiam decision reversing, 34 F. (2d) 263 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929) : Federal tax valid
as to lawyer engaged, pursuant to statutory permission, by attorney general to assist in
prosecuting state inheritance tax cases. See also Miller v. McCaughn, 27 F. (2d) 128

(C. C. A. 3d, 1928): Auditor appointed by state court, whose compensation was paid
by insurance companies he investigated, held taxable. Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U. S. 216,
225 (i93i) : Income tax on profits received from sale of municipal bonds held valid.
6. G. C. M. 13488, XIII-2 Cum. BULL. I56 (1934) suggesting that where the com-

pensation received by state officers or employees is not paid by the state it is not exempt.
This rule was accordingly established by I. T. 2809, XIII-2 Cum. BuLL. i6o (1934).
7. 303 U. S. 218 (1938).
8. Further evidence of the Treasury view is the amendment of January 7, 1938,
changing the regulation in force since U. S. Treas. Reg. 77, Art. 643. The latter read

in part: "Compensation received for services rendered to a State or political subdivision
thereof is included in gross income unless (a) the person receives such compensation
as an officer or employee of a State or other political subdivision, and (b) the services
are renderedin connection with the exercise of an essential governmental function." As

amended, it now reads: "Compensation received for services rendered to a State is to
be included in gross income unless the person receives such compensation from the State
as an officer or employee thereof and such compensation is immune from taxation under
the Constitution of the United States."

9. 304 U. S. 4o5 (1938).
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affirmed the use of the burden test in some instances of taxing compensation of employees of state instrumentalities, it does not require it to be
applied to essential governmental functions of the type contemplated by the
Constitution that the states should indulge in.10 That is, the immunity
of functions similar to that in Collector v. Day, which involved a state
judge, is still absolute, despite the absence of any burden. The contrary
conclusion was reached in Saxe v. Shea,": involving a tax on the income
of a New York Supreme Court referee or special guardian. The case was
decided entirely on the basis that the Gerhardt case made the source of
the income a paramount consideration. 2 However, aside from the Gerhardt case, the language of which is susceptible of diverse constructions,
the Treasury interpretation of the trend of the decisions seems more accurate. If Collector v. Day, though limited strictly to its facts, is today still
good law, the Treasury view would limit the application of its principles
to the functions performed by such state legislative, executive and judicial
officials whose salaries come from the state treasury. 3
Taxation-Validity of Pennsylvania Graduated Chain Store TaxA Pennsylvania statute ' imposed a license tax on the owners of chain stores
and theatres graduated according to the number of stores owned within the
state. On a bill to enjoin the enforcement of the statute, held, that the
classification being based on quantity alone, the statute violates the uniformity clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution. American Stores v.
Boardman, Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Feb. 27, 1939, p. I, col. 3 (Dauphin
Co. Ct. 1939).

As pointed out in a recent issue of the REVIEW, 2 it is well settled that
the Pennsylvania constitutional requirement of uniformity in taxation 3
invalidates a tax graduated at a progressive rate. However, it has never
been clearly settled that this requirement extends to license as well as property taxes.4 The Dauphin County court in refusing to distinguish between
the two types of taxes when it invalidated the chain store tax has followed
the implication in the recent Supreme Court decision that the uniformity
clause means what it says: "all taxes shall be uniform". 5 Since similar
taxes have been sustained under the "equal protection" clause of the Federal Constitution,8 the instant holding, if affirmed by the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, will again illustrate the variance between the requirements of the Federal and Pennsylvania constitutions as to uniformity in
taxation. 7
io. See instant case, pp. 9544, 9545.
II. 98 F. (2d) 83 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938), cert. granted, 59 Sup. Ct. 154 (1938).
12. Id. at 84.
13. Ibid. See also Lowndes, Taxation and the Supreme Court, z937 Termt (1938)
87 U. OF PA. L. REV. I, 14.
(Purdon, Supp. ig38) tit. 72, § 3420-1-II.
Note (1938) 87 U. OF PA. L. REV. 219.
PA. CoNsT. art IX, § i.
See Note (1938) 87 U. OF PA. L. REV. 219, 225.
See Kelley v. Kalodner, 320 Pa. i8o, 187, 181 At. 598, 6o2 (1935) ; see Note
(1938) 87 U. OF PA. L. REV. 219, 222.
6. Tax Commissioners v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527 (1931) ; Fox v. Standard Oil Co.,
294 U. S. 87 (1935); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U. S. 412
I. PA. STAT. ANN.

2.
3.
4.
5.

(937).
7. Compare Magoun v. Illinois, 17o U. S. 283 (1898), with Cope's Estate, I91 Pa.
1, 43 Atl. 79 (1899) (Inheritance taxes) ; Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37 (1920), with
Kelley v. Kalodner, 320 Pa. i8o, 181 Atl. 598 (1935) (Income taxes).
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Torts-Contributory Negligence as a Bar to Guest's Recovery
for Injuries Sustained in Automobile Accident-Plaintiffs, husband
and wife, were guests in defendant's automobile which defendant was driving at excessive speed on an icy road. The wife and another passenger
objected to the speed without effect, and an accident occurred resulting in
injuries to the wife-plaintiff. In a suit to recover for her injuries, held, that
the failure of the husband to protest the excessive speed barred his recovery since it gave rise to a presumption that he had assumed the risks incident to such negligent conduct. Protests by the other guests could not
relieve him of his duty to remonstrate. Apfelbaum et ux. v. Markley, 3 A.
(2d) 975 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1939).
Plaintiff, a guest in defendant's automobile which was being driven
recldessly at a high speed, knew that the defendant was intoxicated. Having ample opportunity to leave the car and conveniently obtain other transportation, plaintiff remained in the car and was injured in an accident resulting from defendant's negligence. In a suit to recover for her injuries,
held, the maxim volenti non fit injuria does not apply to a case of this
nature, since the plaintiff did not expose herself to a known risk of injury
and therefore she is entitled to recover. Dann v. Hamilton, i All. E. R. 59
(K. B. 1938) .1
The Pennsylvania decision follows the overwhelming majority rule in
the United States.2 Though ordinarily the guest is not bound to heed the
manner in which the car is being operated, where he knows or has reason
to know that the driver's conduct is negligent, he is required to make active
protest.4 If his protests prove futile, he should leave the car if he can safely
do so, or at least insist on the driver's halting to permit him to alight."
Thus, in the Apfelbaum case, since the plaintiff did not take measures for
his own safety, when the remonstrances of the others proved futile, he is
barred by his contributory negligence. 6 The contention that the ineffectiveness of the protest by the others should excuse plaintiff's failure has
little force since he had reason to believe that his objections were likely to
be much more effective.7
As the first English case to raise the question of the extent of an automobile guest's duty to act for his own protection, the Dann case reaches an
undesirable result. Whether the problem be thought one of contributory
negligence or of voluntary assumption of risk,' under the weight of Amerii. This case appeared in Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Feb. 6, 1939, p. I, col. I.
See cases collected in Notes (1929) 61 A. L. R. 1252, 1261; (193o) 65 A. L. R.

2.

952, 956. The rule in Massachusetts is that a host is liable to a guest only for injuries
resulting from his "gross negligence". See Corish, The Automobile Guest (1934) 14

B. U. L. REv. 728, criticizing that rule.
3. Tracy v. Welch, io9 Conn. 144, 147, 145 At!. 662, 663 (1929) ; Clark v. Traver,
52, 53 (3d Dep't, I923) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS
(934) § 495, Comment c.
4. Tracy v. Welch, xo9 Conn. 144, 145 At!. 662 (1929); Dale v. Jaeger, 44 Idaho
576, 258 Pac. io8i (1927) ; Clark v. Traver, 205 App. Div. 2o6, 2oo N. Y. Supp. 52 (3d
Dep't, 1923) ; Landy v. Rosenstein, 325 Pa. 209, i88 Ati. 855 (937).
S. Archer v. Bourne, 222 Ky. 268, 300 S. W. 6o4 (1927) ; Sheehan v. Coffey, 205
App. Div. 388, 2oo N. Y. Supp. 55 (3d Dep't, 1923).
6. Sheehan v. Coffey, 205 App. Div. 388, 2o0 N. Y. Supp. 55 (3d Dep't, 1923);
Biersach v. Wechselberg, 206 Wis. 113, 238 N. W. 9o5 (193) ; Clark v. Traver, 205
App. Div. 206, 208, 20o N. Y. Supp. 52, 53 (3d Dep't, 1923) ; cf. Fontaine v. Fontaine,
205 Wis. 570, 238 N. W. 410 (i931).
7. See RESTATEMENT, ToRTs (1934) § 495 and Comment c.
8. The theory on which recovery is to be denied would be of importance in determining whether the evidence must be submitted to the jury as well as in other situations.

2o5 App. Div. 2o6, 207, 2o0 N. Y. Supp.
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9
can authority recovery should have been denied. Treating it as a question
of voluntary assumption of risk, the court held that the plaintiff's conduct
did not relieve the defendant of liability because her entry into the car
knowing that the defendant was intoxicated did not operate to expose her
to an existing risk of harm created by the defendant's negligence, but merely
to a risk arising from the possibility that the defendant would be negligent
in the future. It would seem that such conduct alone should bar recovery
especially since there was ample opportunity to secure other transportation.10 Furthermore, the reasoning ignores the fact that later, when the
car was being driven in an admittedly negligent manner, the plaintiff failed
to protest or request an opportunity to alight, thereby negligently contributing to her injury." Apparently incorrect on negligence principles,
the decision is also difficult to justify on the grounds of policy for it makes
the host a virtual insurer of the guest's safety even where the latter has
ample opportunity to protect himself.

Trade Regulation-Contract Between Movie Distributor and
Exhibitor as Restraint of Trade Under Sherman Act-The eight
major distributors of copyrighted motion pictures dealt in almost uniform
manner with proposals of two allied exhibitors who controlled all first run
and many subsequent run movie houses in Texas. Each distributor agreed
with Interstate Circuit to require from subsequent run licensees of films,
which Interstate had leased for first run purposes, that the films would
neither be double-billed nor shown for less than 250 admission. A similar
agreement was reached between the other exhibitor, Texas Consolidated,
and one of the distributors, Paramount, as to the territory in which Texas
Consolidated was dominant. Held (Justices Roberts, Butler and McReynolds dissenting), the evidence supported the finding of an agreement between the distributors which was in violation of the Sherman Act., Furthermore, each exhibitor-distributor contract, separately considered, was in
violation of the Sherman Act. Interstate Circuitv. United States, 6 U. S.
L. WEEi 8o3 (U. S. 1939).
Although there may be a question in the instant case as to the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant the inferring of an agreement or com2
bination among the distributors, it is clear that if such agreement or comof the Sherman Act., The more imporviolation
in
it
was
existed
bination
tant aspect of the holding is that even without combination among the
distributors the Court would have held the individual distributor-exhibitor
contracts to be in violation of the Sherman Act-in fact, such was the4
holding in connection with the Paramount-Texas Consolidated agreement.
9. Archer v. Bourne, 222 Ky.268, 300 S. W. 604 (1927) ; see also cases collected
in Notes (1936) 38 N. C. C. A. 703; (1938) 2 N. C. C. A. (N. s.) x; RESTATEMENT,
ToRTs (934) § 466 and Comment e.
io. See RESTATEmENT, ToRTs (1934) §§ 466, 495.
ii. See supranotes 2, 4 and 5.
1. 26 STAT. 209 (I89O), I5 U. S. C. A. §§ 1-7 (1927).

The only Section involved

in the instant case was § I : "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal ..
2. See (1938) 38 CoL. L. REv. 696, criticizing the holding of the lower court in this
respect.
3. Straus v. American Publishers Ass'n, 231 U. S. 222 (1913) ; Binderup v. Pathe
Exchange, 263 U. S. 29r (1923).

4. Instant case at 8o7. That such is the gist of the holding is pointed out by Justice
Roberts in his dissenting opinion which assails the majority opinion mostly on this
point. Id. at 8o8.
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In this respect the instant case goes further than former decisions under
the Sherman Act to check the exercise of superior bargaining power to
stifle competition. At common law there was no objection to a purchaser's
stipulation that the seller should not sell to the purchaser's competitors, or
that sales should be made to competitors only on certain 8terms." Such an
agreement has been validated under the Fair Trade Acts, and the implication has seemed to be that it was proper under the Sherman Act, 7 despite
the Act's express prohibition of "Every contract . . . in restraint of

trade",8 unless there existed a combination among competitors to force the
imposition of such terms.' If such were the law, the result in the instant
case would be that an agreement, procured from a distributor by a combination of two small independent exhibitors, providing that the distributor
would not lease films to their much larger competitor, Interstate Circuit,
except on certain restrictive terms, would be invalid; 'o whereas the Interstate Circuit, with a bargaining power vastly superior to that of all the
independent exhibitors combined,11 could compel such an agreement with
impunity. Faced with such a result the Court, carrying out the purpose of
the Act,12 has abandoned the technical requirement of competitor combination in favor of the realistically more important factor-use of monopolistic
bargaining power to supress competition. Of course, even under the instant
holding, agreements brought about by use of tremendous18bargaining power
would only be void if unreasonably in restraint of trade. In giving effect
to the contract prohibition of the Act the Court has not only aided current
of
efforts to protect independent exhibitors from the monopolistic practices
large exhibitor circuits and their producer-distributor affiiates,"* but more
S. Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society v. Glasgow Fleshers Assoc., 35 Scot.

L. R. 645 (Outer House, iW89); Transportation Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 52 W. Va.

6ii, 40 S. E. 591 (i9o2).
6. Federal Trade Commission v. Raymond Bros.-Clark Co., 263 U. S. 565 (929).
7. It has been held that mergers of non-competing companies whose activities are
merely complementary to each other do not violate the anti-trust laws. United States
v. Winslow, 227 U. S. 202 (913); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U. S.
32 (1918); see EULE.R, MONOPOLIES AND TEE FEERAI ANTI-TRuST LAWS (1929)
§ 2o (g). Hence it would seem that a contract between distributor and exhibitor which
merely restricted the distributor in sales to competitors of the exhibitor would be valid.
8. 26 STAT. 209 (i890), I5 U. S. C. A. § i (1927).
9. Grenada Lumber Co. v. Mississippi, 217 U. S. 433 (191o) ; Eastern States Retail
Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U. S. 6oo (1914).
"The illegality consists not in the separate action of each, but in the conspiracy and
combination of all to prevent any of them from dealing with the exhibitor." Binderup
v. Pathe Exchange, 263 U. S. 312 (1923).

io. United Motion Picture Theatre Owners v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 93 F.
(2d) 714 CC. C. A. 3d, 1937).
xi. It is significant to note that, in the instant case, the license fees paid by Interstate Circuit and Texas Consolidated were much larger than those paid by all other
Texas exhibitors. United States v. Interstate Circuit, 2o F. Supp. 868, 872 (N. D.
Tex. 1937).

12. THowrnoN, CoamaiATioxS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE-(1928) § 93.
13. It is settled that the restraint imposed must be unreasonable to be invalidated
under the Sherman Act. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. I (i9x1). The
dissent in the instant case, although partially based on the concept of the nature of the
right granted by the copyright law, seems to be occasioned chiefly by the belief that the
restrictions were reasonably necessary to preserve the value of the films leased. Instant
case at 8op. However, this belief appears to overlook the point made in the majority
opinion that the restrictions were agreed to at the behest of the exhibitors, and hence
the natural conclusion would seem to be that the purpose and effect of the restrictions
is to preserve the monopolistic position of the exhibitors, rather than to preserve the
value of the films ased.
14. It should be noted that, in the instant case, both Texas Consolidated and Interstate Circuit were affiliated with the Paramount Pictures Distributing Co. Instant case
at 803.
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important still, has opened the way to the invalidation of any contracts or
agreements between non-competing complementary firms provided such
contracts tend toward monopoly and restraint of trade.15
Wills-Right of Illegitimate to Inherit When Residue of Estate
Left to "Children"-Testatrix, after making certain bequests, devised
the residue of her estate in equal shares to the children and grandchildren
of B. Relying on a statute ' allowing an illegitimate to inherit from his
intestate father if the paternity was proved or acknowledged during the
father's life, Y, an illegitimate son of B's son C, sought to establish his
rights to a proportionate share of the residue. After C intervened as a
defendant, a demurrer was filed claiming that the word "grandchildren" in
a will included only legitimates unless the will, without extrinsic evidence,
showed an intent to include illegitimates. The demurrer was overruled, 2
and judgment entered against the defendants on their refusal to plead further. On appeal, held (four judges dissenting), where a testator, knowing of the existence of illegitimates, uses the words "children or grandchildren" in a will, an ambiguity is created and extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove the intent of the testator. In re Ellis' Estate, 282 N. W.
758 (Iowa, 1938).
In this country, statutory limitations have modified the common law
rule that an illegitimate child was Jilius nullius " and, in the absence of a
contrary intention expressed by will,4 incapable of inheriting his parents'
property. These statutes 5 are of two general types-those which allow
inheritance only from the intestate mother,6 and those which also permit
inheritance from the intestate father.7 In determining the effect of those
statutes on the present situation, the courts have rendered conflicting decisions. Divergence of judicial opinion has arisen more from diametrical
For a discussion of the problems of the independent exhibitor who competes with

the large circuit exhibitors and the producer affiliate exhibitors see Notes (1936) 36
COL. L. REv. 635, 641; (1938) 33 ILL. L. REv. 424.
The holding in the instant case should prove of value to the Government in their
attempt to cause dissolution of the various producer-distributor-exhibitor affiliated
chains. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., Equity Case No. 87-273 (S. D. N.
Y., petition filed 1938).
15. See supra note 7.
I. IowA CODE (1935)

§§ 12030,

12031.

2. The effect of the demurrer filed by the defendants (including the intervening
father of the plaintiff) was to admit the paternity and the testatrix's knowledge of the
birth of the plaintiff at the time of the execution of her will. Instant case at 759.
3. i BL. CoMm. *459; HOOPER, LAW OF ILLEGTIMACY (1911) I00 et seq.; 2 KENT
COmm. *212 et seq.; Robbins and Deak, The Familial Property Rights of Illegitimate
Children: A Comparative Study (1930) 30 COL. L. REv. 3o8.

4. This represents one of the earliest exceptions evolved by the courts to ameliorate
the harshness of the rule that the illegitimate could not inherit under any circumstances.
Under this rule, an illegitimate could inherit (i) if he was expressly provided for in
his parent's will, or (2) if there was a devise to a class of "children" and there were
no legitimate children living who could take under the will. Hill v. Crook, L. R. 6
H. L. 265 (873).
5. Connecticut is the only state which does not have such a statute but the right
of the illegitimate to inherit through the mother has been firmly established by judicial
decision.

See Eaton v. Eaton, 88 Conn. 269, 91 Atl. 191 (1914).

6. See Legis. (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 531 at 533.
7. Id. at 536. Note that a bastard child cannot inherit from its intestate father in
Connecticut, despite the fact that such inheriance from the mother has received judicial
sanction. Also worthy of note is the Pennsylvania statute which provides that though
an illegitimate may inherit from the intestate mother, the common-law rule regarding
inheritance from the father is to remain unchanged. Ibid.
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views taken of the nature of the statutes rather than from variances in the
provisions of the statutes. Some jurisdictions follow the rule expressed in
the dissent that such legislation is in derogation of the common law, and
thus requires a strict construction." Inherent in their arguments is a reverence for the old concept that the bastard is the child of nobody, and thus
not entitled to a share of the estate; and an unwillingness to defeat the
testator's intent by sanctioning the passage of the estate to those outside
the familial group.9 On the other hand, more progressive courts10consider
They
the statutes as remedial so that they are to be construed liberally.
argue that in modern society the illegitimate is no longer regarded as
filius nullius; and, as pointed out by the court in the instant case, that the
effect of the statute is to raise the illegitimate to such a condition that reference to a familial group in the will creates an ambiguity which warrants
It
the introduction of extrinsic evidence to show the testator's intent.,
seems that this latter interpretation is desirable since it carries into effect
his
the legislative policy of freeing the illegitimate from prejudice from
12
parents' wrongs and offers an opportunity to prove the true intent of the
testator by a preponderance of the evidence sufficient to negative the possibility of fraud.
8. "We must also bear in mind that 'legislation admitting children to the right of
succession is undoubtedly in derogation of the common law and should be strictly construed'." Reynolds v. Hitchcock, 72 N. H. 340, 342, 56 Atl. 745, 746 (1903). See also
Flora v. Anderson, 75 Fed. 217 (C. C. S. D. Ohio, 1896) ; Johnstone v. Taliaferro, 07
Ga. 6, 32 S.E. 931 (1899) ; Lyon v. Lyon, 88 Me. 395, 34 Atl. i8o (1896) ; Kent v.
Barker, 68 Mass. 535 (1854) ; Gibson v. McNeely, ii Ohio St. 131 (186o) ; cf. Brisbin
v. Huntington, 128 Iowa 166, 1O3 N. W. 144 (Io5); Marquette v. Marquette's Ex'rs,
i9o Ky. 182, 227 S.W. 157 (1921).
9.See Note (1932) 45 HARv.L. REv. 890 at 894.
io. "The statute in question is in derogation of the common law, but notwithstanding that fact, it is a remedial statute and should be liberally construed. . . ." State
v. Chavez, 82 P. (2d) 900, 902 (N. M. 1938). See also Hastings v. Rathbone, 194 Iowa
177, 188 N. W. 96o, 23 A. L. R. 392 (1922); Smith v. Smith, 105 Kan. 294, 182 Pac.

538 (igig) ; Estate of Karenius, N. Y. L. J., Feb. 16, 1939, p. 749, col. 1 (N. Y. Surr. Ct.
1939) ; Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Hodgkin, 48 R. I. 459, 137 At. 381 (1927) ;
Dennis v. Dennis, l05 Tenn. 86, 58 S. W. 284 (19oo) ; Bennett v. Toler, i5 Gratt. 588
(Va. I86o). Cf. Elliott v. Elliott, 117 Ind. 380, 2o N. E. 264 (1889); Sullivan v.
Parker, 113 N. C. 3O, 18 S. E. 347 (I893).
ii. See Note (1914) 8 BRirlsH RULING CASES 295.

The author of the article
asserts that the true rule, even in the absence of statutes, should be that the word
"children" in a will was neutral, and created an ambiguity, so that extrinsic evidence
should be admissible to show an intent to include illegitimates in the designated class.
12. Id. at 303. Speaking of the presumption that the word "children" in a will only
includes legitimates, the author there pointed out that "instead of operating as a presumption should operate, only where the testator's intent is in doubt, it has operated .. .
to defeat an intention as to which there was no actual uncertainty", and objected that
"a rule adopted by the courts f6r the purpose of ascertaining the testator's intention
should not so operate as to defeat his intention".

